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SUMMARY 
Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) has reviewed each of the four Element Reports 
prepared under the State of Hawaii Geothermal Action Plan for the PGV KS-8 
geothermal well uncontrolled flow event. The following is an executive summary of 
PGV comments and responses to the four reports. 
PGV agrees with the conclusion of the Element I Report ("Independent Technical 
Investigation of the Puna Geothermal Venture Unplanned Steam Release, June 12 and 
13, 1991, Puna, Hawaii") that the geothermal resource encountered in the KS-8 well, 
although quite hot, is manageable through the use of modem well drilling and 
production technology. Further, PGV generally accepts the recommendations of the 
Element I Report. Attachment I of the Element I Report contains a discussion of the 
actions already taken, or planned to be taken, in response to these recommendations 
and the results of PGV's own internal investigation. us::mll?•: PC" 'r !' a ll 
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believes that it occurred because the drilling encountered a high temperature and high 
pressure geothermal resource at a depth that was more shallow than anticipated. 
PGV's previous experiences with the KS-7 well caused PGV to make significant 
changes to the drilling program implemented for KS-8, and the KS-8 well drilling 
program was prepared to handle any resource of similar characteristics. However, 
the temperatures and pressures of the geothermal resource encountered by the KS-8 
well were substantially higher than those encountered in the KS-7 well. 
PGV concurs that there were a number of indicators preceding the KS-8 "kick" 
(defined by the Element I Report as "the intrusion of formation liquids or gas into a 
well bore which results in an increase in pit volume which, without corrective 
measures, can result in an uncontrolled flow from the well") and "uncontrolled flow 
event" (defined as "the uncontrolled flow of well fluids and/or well fluids from the 
well bore to the surface, or into lower-pressured subsurface zones") which could 
have led PGV to make certain decisions which would have substantially reduced the 
possibility that the KS-8 well kick would have turned into an uncontrolled flow event. 
However, there were also a significant number of additional indicators which led 
PGV to evaluate the situation differently. 
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PGV concurs with the Element I Report that the kick resulted from the drill bit 
encountering a substantially over-pressured geothermal resource, with bottom hole 
pressures sufficient to lift the entire column of moderately weighted drilling mud. 
However, PGV believes that all currently available information demonstrates that the 
kick, and subsequent uncontrolled flow event, of well KS-8 were not created by the 
condition, assumed by the Element I Report, of heavy drilling mud entering the 
fracture and thus leaving the well bore partially void of confining drilling fluid. 
Accordingly, PGV believes that the proper course for future drilling in the Kilauea 
East Rift Zone will be to drill with mud that is sufficiently heavy in weight to 
overcome these relatively shallow high-pressure geothermal fractures. 
In retrospect, PGV also agrees that the 9-5/8" casing should have been set somewhere 
near the 3,177-foot depth. However, at the time the decision was made not to run the 
casing at 3,177 feet, numerous geologic indicators did not show that PGV would 
encounter the type of geothermal resource that was, in fact, encountered. PGV was 
clearly recognizing, as the events were unfolding, the numerous conflicting indicators 
of the status of the geothermal well. These conflicting indicators did not, in PGV's 
evaluation, show the need for setting the casing at 3,177 feet. In addition, this casing 
was nQ1 necessary to ensure proper anchoring of the blowout prevention equipment 
(BOPE), nor would setting any casing at any depth have prevented the kick. 
Finally, PGV believes that the Element I Report statement that sufficient cold water 
pumped down the well bore would certainly be able to completely kill the well during 
the uncontrolled flow event is too limited. Rather, PGV believes that, in addition to 
the use of water, the use of heavy drilling mud and/ or cement may be necessary to 
completely kill the KS-8 well. 
Based upon PGV's review of the Element II Report ("Review of Emergency Plan and 
Response to the 12 June 1991 Uncontrolled Venting of the Puna Geothermal Venture 
(PGV) KS8 Geothermal Well"), PGV's own internal review of the information 
available regarding the emergency response to the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event and 
its consequences, and PGV' s review of the actions taken by all parties during the 
emergency, PGV believes that its approved Emergency Response Plan (ERP), 
specifically Section 8.2.1. of the PGV ERP, adequately anticipated the possible 
occurrence of such an uncontrolled flow event. The PGV ERP provided PGV, 
emergency response personnel and the public with generally accurate information 
regarding the possible consequences of such an event. PGV concurs with the 
principal finding of the Element II Report that "The actual implementation of the 
PGV Emergency Response Plan (ERP) went reasonably well." 
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PGV generally concurs with the recommendations of the Element II Report, and has 
cooperated and will continue to fully cooperate with representatives of the Hawaii 
State Department of Health, Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission, and the 
Hawaii County Local Emergency Response Commission in these matters. PGV 
concurs with the recommendation that the Hawaii State Department of Health (DOH) 
conduct a review of the "action levels" for hydrogen sulfide, although PGV believes 
that the "action levels" already proposed by DOH are appropriate and should be 
accepted as the "action levels" for hydrogen sulfide. PGV also generally agrees with 
the intent of the recommendation to review the PGV ERP, since the PGV ERP 
provides that it "will be updated as appropriate when necessary". 
PGV also agrees with the Element II Report that there appears to have been some 
confusion on the part of emergency response personnel and the public during and 
after the uncontrolled flow event regarding how to proceed, the applicability of the 
temporary housing cost reimbursement, and the PGV employee alarm system. This 
apparent public and agency confusion regarding the emergency episode underscores 
the need for the Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency (HCD), other government 
agencies, and PGV to work harder to educate the community regarding the PGV 
ERP. PGV believes that everyone involved must recognize that the PGV ERP is not 
designed to direct the response actions of either the agencies or the communities in 
the event of any emergency at the PGV facility. This is the responsibility of the 
HCD and the HCD's emergency implementation plan. Accordingly, PGV believes it 
also necessary that the public and other government agencies be educated concerning 
the HCD's implementation plan for any emergency which may arise on the PGV 
facility site. 
PGV believes that the extensive information provided in the Element III-I Report 
("Independent Air and Noise Program Review Concerning the June 1991 Uncontrolled 
Venting of the Puna Geothermal Ventures KS-8 Geothermal Well") can be categorized 
into two areas. First, the Element III-I Report contains a review of the air and noise 
monitoring programs in the Puna area and a "precursory appraisal" of the issued 
permits regarding air and noise. Both of these have only a peripheral applicability to 
the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event. Second, the Element III-I Report discusses 
the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event emission scenario and suggests how to 
anticipate, mitigate and manage any possible similar future events. Both of these 
latter topics bear more directly on the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event. 
PGV agrees with the Element III-I Report recommendation that unifying, or at least 
coordinating, the air monitoring efforts would enhance the regional coverage and the 
consistency of the collected data. However, PGV believes that the Element III-I 
Report summary review of the Hawaii Department of Health (DOH) air permits is, as 
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the Element III-I Report itself indicates, only a "precursory" review, and one which 
PGV believes unfairly and superficially criticizes the DOH and the extensive permit 
conditions which includes many restrictive limitations on the allowable increases in 
ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations. 
PGV believes that the Element III-I Report is misleading when it states that "ambient 
measurements of noise and H2S indicated levels markedly above those anticipated in 
the issued permits as limits or believed to be acceptable," because the uncontrolled 
flow event was obviously not a "permitted" emission, but one covered by the 
emergency event conditions of the permits and the PGV ERP. Further, PGV does not 
believe that the uncontrolled flow event demonstrates that the County of Hawaii 
Geothermal Resource Permit noise limitations should or must be changed. 
The Element III-I Report points out that no noise or hydrogen sulfide mitigation 
systems were installed on the "choke" line. This is because discharge of geothermal 
steam or fluid through the horizontal choke line was not a permitted action, nor was it 
ever considered as an emergency event. PGV's noise abatement consultant was 
on-site during the uncontrolled flow event, and prepared a noise abatement plan. 
However, the plan was not immediately implemented because of safety considerations. 
Attachment I to the PGV Response to the Element I Report contains additional 
information about the systems which have now been installed, and will be installed, to 
abate noise and hydrogen sulfide emissions if such an event were to occur again. 
While emissions estimates discussed in the Element III-I Report may have helped the 
emergency response personnel during the uncontrolled flow event, sampling of the 
KS-8 well was not possible during the uncontrolled flow event for safety reasons. 
PGV also does not disagree with the desirability of characterizing the components of 
drift emissions. However, given the substantial differences between the operation of 
geothermal projects which have continuous drift emissions (e.g., those projects 
operating in The Geysers) and the PGV project (with no normal emissions), PGV 
does not believe that the expense and effort required for ambient monitoring of 
components of the drift are justified. 
PGV cannot accept the basic premise of the entire Element III-II Report 
("Micrometeorological Aerometric and Health Effects Analysis Contribution to the 
Independent Air and Noise Monitoring Program Review Concerning the June 12, 13 
and 14, 1991 Uncontrolled Venting of the Puna Geothermal Ventures KS8 
Geothermal Well"), as expressed in the second sentence of the Executive Summary: 
"The purpose of this study is to provide independent verification of monitoring and 
spot measurements of ambient concentrations of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) as well as 
provide estimates of plume concentration and plume transport paths in areas where 
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documented health effects occurred." PGV finds that the author of the Element III-II 
Report does nQ! provide verification of the hydrogen sulfide monitoring data. Instead, 
the measured field data is manipulated to fit the author's own model of the 
uncontrolled flow event. The estimates of plume concentration and plume transport 
presented in the Element III-II Report are principally based on the undocumented, 
randomly sampled, unsubstantiated health complaints collected by members of the 
community, and no attempt is made to determine the statistical relevance of the 
"sampling" or any linkage to the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event. 
PGV strongly disagrees that the "independent estimates of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) 
ambient concentrations" prepared as a part of this Element III-II Report were "in 
substantial agreement with local monitoring station and mobile spot measurements 
throughout the venting period." In fact, PGV believes that the Element III-II Report 
Figures 3-1 through 3-16 show exactly the opposite. The Element III-II Report 
provides absolutely no statistically-based cause-and-effect relationship between health 
complaints and ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations to justify the extremely 
subjective "finding" that "Local H2S concentration were elevated above health 
significance levels and correlated with health complaints." 
The regional wind flow analysis presented in the Element III-II Report does not 
employ a technically sound approach for estimating plume transport over the two-day 
period in question, and the author of the Element III-II Report has developed no 
statistically-based cause-and-effect relationship between the health complaints and the 
presumed ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations. 
PGV believes the Element III-II Report "finding" that the emission of "other" air 
toxics were of significant health concern is extremely subjective and without any 
reasonable basis for establishing a cause-and-effect relationship. PGV also does not 
agree with the "finding" that it did not utilize Best Available Control Technologies 
and did not utilize equipment described in the Authority to Construct. This finding 
also appears to be beyond the scope of the Element III-II Report's stated purpose. 
Finally, the recommendations presented in the Element III-II Report are simply a 
restated presentation of the recommendations presented in the Element III-I Report, 
and have very little, if anything, to do with the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event or 
its aftermath. 
